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Introduction
This paper investigates the equilibrium structure of an industry in which firms sell a homogeneous good at mill prices by two alternative methods. The first method consists of opening a retail store, which consumers can visit by paying a linear transportation cost. In the spatial price terminology, this method is called 'uniform Free-On-Board (FOB) pricing.'' The other method involves setting up a'mail order business,~where consumers are served by paying a fixed cost, irrespective their initial location. The mail order business serves its c,onsumers by some exogenous technology, e.g. a postal service.
Both selling policies have in common that none of the firms bears transportation costs.
They differ, however, in their impact on consumers' decisions. When a consumer buys at a retail store. his total expenditure equals the price at retail plus his transportation cost to the retail store. In contrast, all consumers buying at the mail order business have the same total expenditure. The store's selling policy implies uniformity of the price only at the store. The mail order business's selling policy implies uniformity of the price --not only at the mail order business, but also at the place of delivery: that is.
the consumer~s home location. The fixed transportation cost implies that a price change affects every consumer equally. Location, therefore, becomes completel} irrelevant when selling occurs by a mail order business.~larkets in which consumers are served by stores and~or mail order businesses include the following: books. clothing. computers.Z flowerbulbs, photographic developing, records, banking and insurance products, etc... . This paper aims to investigate the conditions and properties of an industry with the above characteristics.
The anah-sis adds a mail order business to the standard circle model à la Salop (1979) .
I characterize the protected monopol};3 the oligopol}' and free entr}~equilibrium, and the social optimum. It is never optimal for the monopolist to offer at the same time both selling policies. i.e. stores and a mail order business.~~'ith free entry. onl}~one store or ' In d~scussing this spatial price policy. Phlips (1983) remarks "In an} event. the net producer pnce (after deduction of freight) is the same whatever the destination. since at any point of delivery the delivered price is equal to the factorv price plus actual carriage costs'~(p 2d).
-1n 1991. 229C of all miuocomputers in the C~S were sold through the mail (see~fc~5"illiams (1991)).
3i e a monopolist 'who dces not face the threat of entry' ( Bonanno (198 ï) . p 39).
2 mail order business is allowed per firm. If the set-up cost is large relative to the margínal transportation cost, no mail order business appears. However, at most one mail order business emerges in equilibrium. The presence of a mail order business implies more competition, compared to the original Salop-model. As a result, a smaller number of firms is active in equilibrium. Finally, in the social optimum, it is never optimal to offer both selling policies at the same time.
The importance of mail order businesses varies between countries. In terms of per capita expenditures for 1991, it ranges from~23 in Italy. to~w273 in the L'nited States.
As a percentage of the total turnover in the non-food retail trade in 1991, the mail order industry represented fi.1clc in France, 4.7Q1c in Sweden, and in the total retail trade,~1.ïcic in the Federal Republic of Germany." These figures, however, take no account of the importance of the mail order business in a particular industry. They include industries where no mail order business exists. Excluding these industries will increase the mail order industr}''s share.
The subject of the paper clearly differs from Thisse and~-ives (1988) , in which firms make strategic choices in terms of spatial price policy. Thisse and Vives consider two price policies: uniform FOB pricing and discriminatory pricing. They find "a robust tendencv for a firm to choose the discriminatory policy" (p. 134). In footnote 8. they remark: "let us emphasize the fact that what we call here uniform pricing is different from uniform delivered pricing as defined in postage stamp systems.'~This paper takes these two variants of uniform pricing as the available strategic choices for selling products.
.~mai] order business can serve the entire market without affecting the consumer's cost of being served. This differs from uniform zone pricing in at least two ways. First, uniform zone pricing implies that every consumer within a well-defined region is charged the same price. Actual transportation costs. however, are borne by the firm. By choosing such a pricing policy, the firm faces a minimization problem for its total transportation costs. Second, the larger the market that is being served. the larger the average transportation cost is. Therefore, and in contrast with the mail order business, location One recent article in the economics literature on mail order businesses versus retail stores is~Iichael (199~). He uses the theory of transaction costs to explain marketing channels. His analysis focusses on differences in costs of physical distribution and of informing the consumers in mail order businesses and retail stores. Changes over time in these costs significanth-affected the sales of mail order businesses. The empirical results also support the assertion that a higher density of population makes retailing relati~'ely more ad~~antageous.
[n contrast tsith the economics literature. the marketing and retailing literature focusses on the mail order industr~~(see e.g. Darian (198ï) ). The central theme is on the relationship between demographic characteristics at the household level and (mail orderl shopping beha~.ior. This paper studies the impact of selling by' a mail order business 'There is, however. a considerable body of literature on endogenous (spatial) pricing policies Spiegel (1982) demonstrates that sellers preter the 'meet the competition' policy to uniform delivered pricing and mill pricing. Furlong and Slotsce (1983) show that a monopohst can increase profits when the choice is available between mill and uniform delivered pricing. In a different context. Bester (1993) analyzes whether posted prices or negotiated pricing will emerge in a market with quality uncertainty.
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on competition with retail stores. In the same line as the cited article by Thisse and 'ives, the analysis stresses that "current business practices refiect a strategic positioning of firms in the market" (p. 122).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyzes the optimal structure for a monopolist. In order to focus on strategic interactions between firms, section 4 studies the oligopoly case. Section~considers the equilibrium market structure in a free-entry context. Section 6 addresses a welfare analysis. Finally, section ï contains some concluding remarks.
The Model
Consider a market for a homogeneous product. Vlarginal cost of production is constant and without loss of generality normalized at zero. There is a unit mass of consumers whose initial locations are uniformlv distributed on a circle with densitt~one. The consumers buv from that firm that offers the lowest full price. i.e. mill price plus fixed or linear transportation cost. Each consumer has the same reserration price r and bucs at most one unit of the good.
óThe model assumes that price disaimination based on the consumer's address is illegal. This seems reasonable if the analvsis concentrates on competition w~ithin one country.
3 Monopoly
Consider a protected monopolist who can make use of both selling policies. The monopolist decides on the number of stores on the circle, whether to set up a mail order business and, for each of these selling policies, what prices to charge. There is an identical positive set-up cost F for every mail order business and each store on the circle.
Assume that r~t so that, with onl}' one store on the circle, it is in the monopolist's interest to serve the whole market. In addition, assume that r~cp, so that a mail order business can operate for some positive set-up cost. If. in equilibrium, the monopolist uses both selling policies.
(1 -2n~Y~2t)(r-r) , nmF.
.after some rearranging. the function becomes In other words, the monopolist either opens retail stores or one mail order business. The intuition is as follows. Suppose opening a single mail order business is profitable. In addition. suppose the opening of one or more retail stores together with the mail order business yields extra profits, despite the additional fixed set-up costs. Then, ignoring integer problems, the monopolist's optimal decision is to serve the whole market by retail stores. In that case, the mail order business serves no consumers. Therefore, the monopolist opens no mail order business. If, on the contrary, opening the extra retail store does not yield extra profits, he opens a single mail order business.
ïr(n~, nm) is non-decreasing in n~as long
i 1 possible alternatives: (i) no firm operates a mail order business, and (ii) exactly one firm sells through the mail.
The first case is identical to Salop's circle model of product differentiation. All~~'
firms decide to open a store on the circle. The distance between every pair of firms equals l~.N'. Suppose firm i chooses a price p;, and that p is the price charged by the other firms. Then, a consumer located at distance a from firm i, with x E [0, 1~.V], is indifferent between buying from firm i and its neighbor if
The difference (1~:V -x) is the distance between the indifferent consumer's location a and the neighboring firm. Solving (1) for x, one obtaíns firm i's demand at both sides.
Define profits as total demand times price, and firm i's profit equals
P-P~ftl-tiP~( P~-P) -~xP; -t
Optimizing this with respect to p;, p; -0.5(p~-t~.V) is firm i's optimal price, given p. B}s ymmetry. set p, -p. This yields the symmetric solution, so that p; -p' -t~~'.' Firm i~s market share then becomes 1~.V. It follows that every firm's gross profit, expressed as a function of the number of firms a', equals t Fs(-~) -`-s Expression (3) will be referred to as the S-equilibrium profit.
(3)
In the second case, onlv one firm decides to become a mail order business: the other (.`' -1) firms are equally spaced around the circle. Each of the (:~' -1) firms on the circle is at distance 1~(.~' -1) from its two neighbors on the circle. Each firm i on the circle now faces three competitors: the two nearest ones on the circle and the mail order business. In between even two neighboring firms on the circle. two indifferent consumers This analysis also assumes that the matket equilibrium lies in the competitive region of firm i's demand cune. Tha[ is, the reservauon price r~3t~2 (see Salop ( 1979) for the exposition). 
Equation ( 
The profit for the mail order business eyuals
Expression ( Substitute expressions (13) and (14) into (7) and (10) to see that the profits expressed as a function of the number of firms~ti' arẽ~(
a') -lst((,v t 1) t 2.~)~(1')
for ecerv firm on the circle. and
2(.~"-I) t .tir ( -~)
for the mail order business. The expressions (1~) and (16) will be referred to as the :tl-equilibrium profits.
Before starting with the main proposition of this section, I define the function 
the opposite inequality holds, i.e. Y) h(.V). Firm i locates on the circle and no other firm switches to the center. This establishes part (b). t]
Yroposition 2 implies that if some firm sets up a mail order business, the cost of sending the good through the mail should be small enough. In that case. the parametric constellations result in an .Ll-equilibrium. Since ;~is non-negative. and in an .LI-equilibrium not larger than h(.~~), we hace that h(.~') ) 0. From the properties of this function.
the lower bound on the number of firms in an 1f-equilibrium is~~1 3. The intuition is that a firm has an incentive to open a mail order business onl}~if its profit as a firm on the circle is relativeh~small. In an .Lf-equilibrium. the mail order business foregoes some market power b}~a decrease in the equilibrium prices. Therefore, a single firm on the circle has no incentive to become a mail order business if the gain in market share
is not large enough. The mail order business has a larger market share in comparisoñ cith the firms' market shares in the S~quilibrium. Indeed. Y C h(.`') implies that in the .L~equilibrium, the result follows.P roposition 3 holds because prices in the M-equilibrium are lower than they are in the Sequilibrium. As already noted before, the mail order business has a larger market share vis-à-Lis the firms' market shares in the S-equilibrium. Therefore, lower prices and market shares for firms on the circle result in lower pro6ts.
Free Entry Equilibrium
This section studies entry into the industry. In order to have a finite number of firms.
I introduce a fixed set-up cost of production F. The oligopoly two-stage game of the pre~.ious section is now enlarged by an additional stage. The three-stage game proceeds as follows: In the first stage, each firm decides whether or not it will enter the market.
Having observed the number of firms entering the market, the entrants play the twro-stage game of the precious section. Those who do not enter recei~~e zero profits.
The precious section established that the S-and af-equilibrium are possible candidates satisfying the subgame perfectness condition. Our concept of free-entn. equilibriurn requires that entering firms earn non-negative profits, and all other firms anticipate non-positi~-e profits when entering (see Anderson, de Palma. and Thisse. 1992 ). This moti~~ates the following two definitions:
Definition 1:~~S is the number of firms in a free-entry S-eyuilibrium if (i) r,s(~"~) -F:
and (ii) rs(:~~s) ? r.vf(-~s).
Condition (i) ensures that all firms make zero profits. IC implies that NSt~F, by (3). Condition (ii) guarantees that with the equilibrium number of firms in the market, no firm wants to switch to a mail order business. The condition is equivalent to ;~~h(:~`S) (i.e., the condition in Proposition 2). In the free-entry S-equilibrium, therefore, Y ? h( t~F).
Definition 2: .~'~f is the number of firms in a free-entry Alequilibrium if (i) r~(a'.u) -
F: and ( ii) rr.M(:v!y) ? rs(:tititf).
The first condition ensures that all firms on the circle make zero profits. Proposition Proposition 4 states that the number of firms in the free-entry S-equilibrium is larger than it would be in the free entry .N-equilibrium. Therefore, the market with a mail order business is more competitive. This accords with the result that nonlocalized competition yields fewer firms in a free-entry equilibrium than it would in localized competition (see Deneckere and Rothschild. 1992) . The conditions for an S-and .1~equilibrium are now analyzed. Since :p 1 0, a'i1 ? 3 if an .b!-equilibrium exists. t7
Lemma 3: (i) h(3) -
An increase in y implies more friction in the market and pre~~ents the mail order business from decreasing the prices drastically. Therefore, more firms can enter the market. w~2iF -F, the social planner opens the optimal number of stores on the circle, whereas the monopolist opens only one mail order business ( region 11). The intuition is that the social planner is interested in the average consumer, whereas the monopolist seeks to serve the marginal consumer. Therefore, the monopolist locates closer to the marginal consumer than does the social planner. A higher critical~supports this idea.
It is, therefore. of no surprise that the social planner opens less stores compared to the monopolist.
The oligopoly and free-entry analysis showed that firms on the circle and a mail order business can coexist as an equilibrium. From proposition 4, the number of firms in the free-entn~Sequilibrium is larger compared to the af-equilibrium. This result weakens the familiar proposition that competition cceates too much variety compared to the social optimum (see e.g. Salop (19 ï9) ). Continuing the numerical example. take t-100, F-1 and y-1. The number of firms in a Salop model equals 10, whereas only 3.1 ï firms (of which one as a mail order business) enter the market in the free entry .W-equilibrium.
The monopolist opens only one mail order business. The free entry .11-equilibrium is suboptimal, sínce firms on the circle and a mail order business appear. In the social optimum, only one mail order business appears.
Conclusion
This paper examined a spatial model on the circle where firms can either sell by a store or b}-a mail order business. Selling b}-a store implies a transportation cost for the consumers that increases with distance. In contrast, selling by a mail order business implies a fixed cost for the consumer, regardless of his location. In a free-entry context, at most one mail order business emerges. Competition increases and, as a consequence. the number oí firms entering the market is lower, compared to the well-known Salop model.
The mail order business competes with every firm on the circle. and therefore engages in nonlocalized competition. The stores on the circle face only one local competitor -
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-i.e. the mail order business. In the monopoly and the social optimum. stores and mail order businesses never appear together.
The result that at most one mail order business will emerge, of course, depends on the implicit assumption that consumers are perfectly informed about the existence of the mail order business. The model, however, can be modified by introducing advertisements, for example. Then, consumers are informed about the existence of the products offered. .a mail order business attracts consumers depending on its advertising costs. In addition, this model assumes that consumers are perfectly aware of the quality of the product. If quality inspection before purchase is costly, a mail order business ma}' have a strategic disadvantage. Finally, in a multi-country framework, the mail order businesses may be able to use consumers' addresses as a price discriminating device --yet another interesting topic for future research.
